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Financial Networks and Systemic Risk in China’s Banking System 
                           Lixin Sun1 
Abstract: In this paper, using two alternative methods, we investigate the contagion 
effects and systemic risk in China’s commercial banks system based on the balance 
sheet data and the estimation on interbank exposures. First, we calculate various 
indicators in terms of the balance sheets of individual commercial banks to quantify 
contagiousness and vulnerability for China’s banking system without considering the 
detailed topology of interbank networks. Second, we estimate the detailed bilateral 
exposures matrix of the interbank network to examine the domino effects and 
snowball effects of financial contagion. The simulation results from two alternative 
approaches are consistent. Both suggest that the contagious risk arising from an 
assumed bank failure is trivial in Chinese banking system, whereas the amplification 
effects of the losses due to the financial interlinkage are non-trivial. In particular, we 
identify the systemic important banks in terms of a relative contagion index and the 
measures capturing the topological features of the interbank networks, respectively. 
Our study provides insights for the prevention of systemic risk and the 
implementation of macroprudential oversights in China’s banking system.  
Keywords: Balance Sheets; Interbank Networks; Financial Contagion; Systemic Risk; 
China’s Banking System 
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1. Introduction 
The “too connected to fail” (TCTF) problem in modern financial system has attained 
more and more concerns from academics and policymakers recently, because the 
financial interlinkages stemming from both asset and liability sides of financial 
institutions’ balance sheets would spread and amplify the damage effects of various 
shocks by creating channels of financial contagion, and thereby yields systemic risk 
and financial disruptions at macro level. The interbank markets across the countries, 
especially in advanced economies, have been the focuses of the studies on financial 
contagion that could lead to systemic risk due to their typical financial interconnected 
structure2, whereby the systemic important financial institutions are identified and the 
insights for macroprudential regulation are developed. Concentrating exclusively on 
China’s interbank markets in this paper, we investigate the topological features of 
China’s banking system, and measure the systemic contagion effects of financial 
networks when a bank failure occurs under an idiosyncratic shock which wipes out its 
outside assets. Our study complements the existing literature by applying two 
alterative methodologies in assessing the contagion risk and identifying the 
systemically important banks, thereby sheds lights on the prevention of systemic risk 
and the implementation of macroprudential policy for China’s financial stability. 
Our study and the contributions to the literature can be summarized in several 
respects. First of all, following the methodology proposed by Glasserman and Young 
(2015, 2016), we use the balance sheet data of China’s commercial banks to examine 
the contagious effects and systemic risk in the interbank market without considering 
the detailed topological structure of Chines interbank markets. In doing so, we find 
that the probability of contagion arising from the failure of one bank is minimal or 
                                                             
2 See, the related literature in Section 2.  
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almost impossible in terms of our sample. Nevertheless, the calculated multiplying 
factors show that the amplification effects of the losses stemming from a bank default 
through the channel of interbank interconnectedness are non-trivial, reaching 
approximately 2.73 times. Second of all, we define a relative contagion index, which 
is calculated in terms of the structural variables of a bank’s balance sheet, reflecting 
the financial connectivity and the outside leverage of a bank, With this relative 
contagion index, we identify the systemic important banks in China. Third of all, we 
employ the maximum entropy approach to estimate the bilateral exposures matrix of 
the interbank network, and then analyse the topological features of Chinese banking 
system by applying k-clique, partitioning, and hierarchical clustering techniques. The 
results demonstrate that Chinese interbank network presents a typical core-periphery 
structure. In addition, we find that the network centrality coefficients of banks are 
significantly correlated with the interbank assets, interbank liabilities and total assets, 
and therefore closely connected with the abovementioned relative contagion index. 
Fourth of all, we simulate the contagion effects and systemic risk with the estimated 
topological matrix by calculating the number of banks that default by contagion and 
the losses as a fraction of the total assets caused by an assumed bank failure due to an 
idiosyncratic shock. The simulation results in terms of the round-by-round algorithm 
show that, the contagious possibility of a bank failure through the interbank network 
is very low, whereas the losses amplified suffered from the bank failure through the 
interbank network are relatively high in China. Finally, our study illustrates that the 
simulation results from two approaches 3  are consistent. In sum, our empirical 
simulations suggest that the domino effects of financial contagion in Chinese banking 
system are trivial, whereas the amplification effects of financial contagion due to the 
                                                             
3 As abovementioned, one only uses the balance sheet data without considering the detailed topological structure, 
another one needs to estimate the bilateral exposures matrix.    
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financial interconnectedness are non-trivial. Therefore, the systemic risk in Chinese 
interbank market should attain proper concern by the policymakers and prudential 
regulators.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the progress in 
related literature. Section 3 presents the data and the stylized facts of Chinese banking 
system. Section 4 describes the methodology. Section 5 simulates the financial 
contagion and calculates the systemic losses arising from a bank default without 
considering the detailed topology of China’s interbank networks. Section 6 
investigates contagion risk and systemic losses through the transmission channels of 
estimated interbank networks. Section 7 makes the conclusive remarks.  
2. Related Literature 
In the aftermath the global financial crisis of 2008, there is growing interest in the 
analysis of financial contagion and the relevant systemic risk, particularly using 
network models. Banks are highly interdependent and closely linked together via 
bilateral exposures in the interbank market, forming a typical financial network, 
which promotes the efficiency of banking system by sharing the risk and reducing the 
costs on one hand, provides spreading and propagation channels of systemic risk 
within the financial system on the other hand. Thus, the interbank networks have 
commanded the attention of much of academic literature and have dominated the 
discussion on the financial instability and the macroprudential regulation.  
In a foundational research, Allen and Gale (2000) show that the pattern of 
interconnectedness of the banking sector or the topological structure of interbank 
markets is crucial for the possibility of financial contagion. They suggest that a 
“complete” structure of interbank network enhance the ability of withstand shocks to 
the banking system than an incomplete structure, where every bank doesn’t have 
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symmetric linkages with all other banks in the financial system. Unfortunately, the 
actual structure of the interbank networks is unknown in most countries because 
national authorities and banks do not release the relevant data4. A solution to this 
problem is to estimate the adjacent matrix of the bilateral claims and obligations by 
maximum entropy in terms of bank balance sheet data. Following this methodology, 
vast studies on various interbank markets across countries contribute to the growing 
body of literature: Sheldon and Maurer (1998) for the Swiss banks; Upper and Worms 
(2004) for the German banking system; Boss et al. (2004) for the Austrian interbank 
market; Wells (2004) for the UK-resident banks; van Lelyveld and Liedorp (2006) for 
the Dutch banking sector; Elsinger et al. (2006a, b) for the Austrian banking system; 
Mistrulli (2011) for Italian interbank market. Although the maximum entropy method 
is optimal and extensively applied when the true network structure is unknown, some 
inherited drawbacks, in particular the assumption of complete interbank linkages, 
could lead to misleading results or biases because the real interbank networks are 
typically sparse and relationship-oriented. As such, alternative methods are developed 
for estimating the topological structure of interbank networks, including the transfer 
entropy method proposed by Li et al. (2013), and the minimum density approach 
developed by Anand et al. (2014). The former builds the interbank market structure by 
calculating the transfer entropy matrix using bank stock price sequences. The latter 
loads the most probable links with the largest exposures consistent with the total 
claims and obligations of each bank to produce the interbank network topology. Liang 
et al. (2016) find that the simulations based on the results from the transfer entropy 
and from the maximum entropy are consistent when applied to Chinese banking 
system. In contrast, Anand et al. (2014) show that the maximum-entropy method 
                                                             
4 Germany, Italy and Brazil are ones of few exceptions, where the true bilateral exposures are reported to the 
monetary authorities. See, for example, Memmel et al. (2012), Craig and von Peter (2010), Mistrulli (2011), and 
Cont et al. (2012).  
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underestimates the contagion risk, whereas the minimum-density method may 
overestimate it when used in a stress-testing context.   
A second methodology for investigating financial contagion in the interbank 
markets is proposed by Glasserman and Young (2015, 2016), which assess the 
contagion risk without considering the detailed topology of the interbank networks, 
instead only use the balance sheets data including the aggregate bilateral exposures5. 
Our study firstly employs their theorems to quantify the contagion risk and identify 
systemic important institutions for Chinese banking system, and then compare the 
results with the results from the simulation by estimating the topology of Chinese 
banks with the maximum entropy method.  
Generally, network models examine the contagion and systemic risk by 
calculating the number of institutions that defaults by contagions and the losses as a 
fraction of the total assets that arise from an assumed bank default in the banking 
system. In simulating the effects of the financial contagion among a fraction of US 
banks, Furfine (1999, 2003) firstly developed the round-by-round algorithm (or 
sequential default algorithm named by Upper, 2011), in which a bank failure due to an 
idiosyncratic shock is assumed and then the losses of other banks that have exposures 
to the failed bank are calculated and compared with their capitals. If the losses are 
greater than its capital for any bank, the relevant bank fails and drops from 
consideration. The simulation is then iterated by assessing if banks fail in each round 
make other banks fail in later round, the iteration procedure continues until no bank 
failure. This algorithm is extensively employed by researchers6. A second algorithm is 
the fictitious defaults algorithm with the clearing vector proposed by Eisenberg and 
Noe (2001), which investigate the path of contagion from the trigger to the first and 
                                                             
5 This method derives from the fictitious defaults algorithm proposed by Eisenberg and Noe (2001), we will 
describe it in Section 5 in detail.  
6 See, the Appendix 1 in Upper (2011).  
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higher rounds of contagion. The difference between two algorithms, according to 
Upper (2011), lies in how to deal with the simultaneity problem. The round-by-round 
method does not consider the impact of higher order defaults on the losses of 
previously failed banks, whereas the fictitious defaults algorithm does. Our 
simulations in Section 6 follow the sequential default approach.  
At least three mechanisms of financial contagion7 through the banking networks 
have been observed and simulated in literature: the first is the “Domino effect” (the 
failure of a single bank can potentially trigger a whole chain of subsequent failures) or 
the knock-on effect through the direct spread channel of lending exposures in the 
interbank, which measures the possibility of contagion. The second is the “Snowball 
effect” or the amplification effect through the propagation of contagious damaging 
within interbank networks, which calculates the severity of contagion. The third one is 
the “Spiral effect” or fire sale externality, in which liquidity shortage in the interbank 
market caused by two abovementioned effects leads to the fire sale of banks’ outside 
assets to satisfy the capital requirements and the interbank exposures, forcing the 
vicious fall in the price of assets and thus the losses-given-default, which introduces 
other banks to sell non-liquid assets under distress, eventually enhance a small shock 
into a spiralling chain of sales and losses by a positive feedback circle8.  
The insights provided by the empirical works with network model include: first, 
the interbank network does affect the overall level of systemic risk within the 
financial system due to the spread and propagation effects of contagion in the system. 
Second, contagious risk occurs with low probability9 in most economies but produces 
high costs once it happens. Third, the bank-specific features and the topological 
                                                             
7 See, a detailed discussion on the channels of financial contagion, for example, the survey by Upper (2011).  
8 See, for example, the discussions by Aldasoro et al. (2016). 
9 Cont et al. (2012), however, show that the contagions are more frequent than previous studies when examining 
the actual the network structure of the Brazilian financial system.  
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structure of interbank networks determine the transmission channels of financial 
contagion and thereby uncover the formation mechanism of systemic risk in the 
banking system, should therefore be attained more concerns by the policy makers and 
prudent regulators.  
3. Data and China’s Interbank Market 
In broad terms, China’s interbank markets consist of FX spot market, money market, 
bond market, and derivative market. This paper restricts it to the money market in 
which financial institutions conduct bilateral trading. The participants in China’s 
interbank market contain policy banks, commercial banks, cooperatives, insurance 
companies, security companies, trustees, financial funds, and other financial 
companies. Given that commercial banks dominated the bilateral transactions in the 
interbank market and banking activities in China’s banking sector (Figure 1 presents 
China’s banking sector), we focus on three categories of commercial banks in our 
study: 5 big state-owned commercial banks, 12 joint-stock commercial banks and 133 
city commercial banks10. The total assets of these three types of commercial banks 
account for approximately 88.45% of the aggregate assets owned by all commercial 
banks, and account for approximately 69.14% of the assets owned by all banks. Our 
sample data of banks’ balance sheet source from the Wind database (hereafter Wind) 
and China Banking Regulatory Commission (hereafter CBRC). Due to the data 
availability for 2015, 124 rather than 133 city commercial banks are adopted in our 
sample, besides all the big state-owned commercial banks and the joint-stock 
commercial banks.  
    Figure 2 depicts the changes in the total assets and total liabilities of the 
commercial banks for the period of 2003-2015. At the end of 2015, the total assets of 
                                                             
10 The other two types of commercial banks are rural commercial banks and foreign commercial banks.  
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the banking sector reached 199,345.4 billion yuan (RMB, China’s national currency), 
which is approximately 7.21 times the level of 2003, with the average annual growth 
rate at 47.75%. On the other hand, the total liabilities and the net assets of the banking 
sector are 184,140.1 and 15,205.3 billion yuan, which are approximately 6.92 and 
14.29 times the levels of 2003, respectively.  
                   Figure 1 China’s Banking Sector 
 
  Figure 2, Changes in the Balance Sheets of the Banking Sector (Unit, Billion Yuan) 
 
Source: CBRC 
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The total assets, total liabilities and net assets of the commercial banks are 
plotted in Figure 3 for the period of 2003-2015. The total assets, total liabilities and 
net assets grew by average annual rates at 51%, 49%, and 104% during 2003-2015, 
reaching 155,825.7, 144,268.2, and 11,557.5 billion yuan at the end of 2015, 
respectively.  
Figure 3 Changes in Balance Sheets of the Commercial Banks (Unit, Billion Yuan) 
 
Source: CBRC 
   Figure 4 presents the changes in the shares of balance sheet data for each category 
of commercial banks in the banking sector at the end of 2015. It indicates that the 
three categories of commercial banks in our sample account for approximately 70% of 
the banking sector.   
    Figure 4 Shares of Each Category of Commercial Banks at the end of 2015 
 
Source: CBRC 
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The evolution of trade volumes in China’s interbank market during 2003-2015 is 
illustrated in Figure 5. At the end of 2015, the interbank market borrowings attained 
64,200 billion yuan, which is approximately 93.17% of current GDP. Despite its rapid 
growth, China’s interbank market is still under developing and needs time to mature. 
Figure 5 Trade Volumes in China’s Interbank Market (Unit: Billion Yuan) 
 
Source: Wind. 
4. Balance Sheets and Interbank Networks-Methodology 
Following Allen and Gale (2000), Glasserman and Young (2015, 2016), the stylized  
balance sheet of an individual commercial bank i  is depicted in Figure 6, in which 
the bank’s assets compose of the outside (interbank market) assets (denoted by ia ) 
and the interbank assets (denoted by ijj c∑ ). The former is the claims of bank i  on 
entities such as loans and equities outside the interbank market. The latter represents 
the claims of bank i  on other financial institutions in the interbank market. Similarly, 
the bank has two types of liabilities: outside liabilities (denoted by ib ), which are 
obligations to entities such as deposits from the households outside the interbank 
market; and interbank liabilities (denoted by iji c∑ ), which are obligations to other 
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financial institutions in the interbank market. The difference between the bank’s assets 
and liabilities are the net worth (denoted by ie )  
             Figure 6 Stylized Balance Sheet of a Bank 
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    The interbank claims and obligations ( ijc s in Figure 6) connect the commercial 
bank together and formulate a financial network, in which an individual bank is 
represented by a vertex, and the links (directed edges or arcs) between banks show the 
bilateral exposures relationships. Specifically, in an interbank network we use 
outwards arrowed lines to represent the claims (interbank assets) that the starting 
vertex owed to the ending vertex (the arrow pointing to), and the inward arrowed lines 
to represent the obligations that the ending vertex owes to the starting vertex. In 
addition, the sizes of the bilateral exposures between banks are defined by weights 
and shown by the strength of the lines in the network. Therefore the interbank 
networks in our study are weighted directed networks, in which the number of the 
bilateral connections in a directed network is identified by the in-degree and 
out-degree of vertices, respectively, in terms of the edges’ direction.  
    More specifically, a weighted directed network 11  can be described by an 
adjacency matrix C  with entries ijc  , where ijc  denotes the exposure of bank j  
towards bank i , or the claims that bank i  towards bank j . For N  banks, we have 
                                                             
11 More detailed discussions on the complex networks, see, for example, Newman (2010), Chen et al. (2015), and 
Sun and Shi (2015). 
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following adjacency matrix 
           
11 1 1
1
1
j N
i ij iN
N Nj NN
c c c
C c c c
c c c
 
 
 
 =
 
 
 
  
 

 

 
  
    where the sum of the elements in a given row :i  
1
N
ij
j
c
=
∑ , denotes the total 
interbank assets owned by bank i , and the sum of the elements in a given column j :  
1
N
j ij
i
l c
=
=∑ , denotes the total interbank liabilities of bank j . Straightforwardly, the 
diagonals of the matrices C  are all zeros.  
The balance sheets and the interbank topology provide a framework by which we 
can simulate the financial contagion and systemic events to prevent the occurrence of 
the financial fluctuation. In what follows, we will flesh out this framework with the 
balance sheets data and interbank structure of China’s commercial banks, and then 
examine the contagion risk and systemic losses of Chinese banking system through 
the interbank channels of propagation and amplification subjects to an idiosyncratic 
shock by using two alternative approaches. 
5. Measuring Contagion and Systemic Risk without Considering the Detailed 
Interbank Structure  
Glasserman and Young (2015, 2016) developed the following theorems to assess the 
contagiousness and vulnerability of financial institutions without knowing the details 
of the entire interbank network structure.  
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Glasserman and Young Theorem 1 12 Assume the shocks are i.i.d., beta 
distributed, and that the net worth of every vertex is initially nonnegative. Let D  be 
a nonempty subset of vertices and let i D∉ , contagion from i  to D  is impossible if 
           ( 1)j i i i
j D
e e ρ θ
∈
> −∑                      (1) 
and it is weak if  
           ( 1) /j i i i j
j D j D
e e ρ θ θ
∈ ∈
> −∑ ∑               (2) 
where iρ  denotes the financial connectivity of bank i , measured by the 
proportion of bank 'i s  liabilities to other entities in the financial system: 
/ ( )i i i il b lρ = + . iθ  denotes the leverage of bank 'i s  outside assets: / 1i i ia eθ = ≥ .  
Note that the right-hand side of (1) is defined as contagion index of bank i  by 
Glasserman and Young (2016). The contagion index calculates the currency amount 
of bank 'i s obligations to other banks, and thus the potential impact on the rest of the 
banking system if i  defaults. A higher contagion index implies that the relevant bank 
is more susceptible to failure (due to high leverage) that has large consequences (due 
to its size) and potentially large impacts on the rest of the banking system (due to its 
high financial connectivity) (Glasserman and Young, 2016).  
The total leverage of bank i (denoted by *iθ ) equals to its total asset divided by 
its net worth, producing * *( ) / ,i i i i i i ib l e eθ θ θ= + + ≥ . The condition that bank j  is 
relatively immune to a shock from bank i  satisfy  
          */ ( 1) / ( 1)ji j i ic e θ θ< − −                         (3) 
Theorem 1 developed by Glasserman and Young (2015) implies that the 
financial contagion in a financial system depends on some critical parameters, such as 
                                                             
12 On the proofs of the regarding theorems, see, Glasserman and Young (2015). 
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the financial connectivity, the net worth, and the degree of leverage of bank i , rather 
than on the distribution of shocks or on the topology of the network.  
Glasserman and Young Theorem 2. Let ( , , , )N a b e P  be a financial system 
and let ON   be the analogous system with all the connections removed. Assume that 
the shock distribution is homogeneous in assets and IFR13. Let max 1i iρ ρ
+ = <  and 
let ( )i i iP eσ ε= ≥ . The ratio of expected losses in the original network to the expected 
losses in ON  is at most  
       1
(1 )
i i
o
i
aL
L a
σ
ρ+
≤ +
−
∑
∑
                           (4) 
where iσ  is the probability of default for bank i . If introducing the marginal 
probability of default σ , the 1
1
m σ
ρ+
= +
−
 can be defined as the amplification 
factor of the financial networks.  
Using the balance sheet data of China’s commercial banks at the end of 2015, 
which are composed of 5 big state-owned commercial banks, 12 joint-stock 
commercial banks, and 133 city commercial banks14, we calculate the contagion 
indices for the banks and assess the contagion risk in China’s interbank market. Table 
1 in Appendix summarizes the results.  
Columns 4-9 in Table 1 present the components of balance sheets of commercial 
banks. Column 10 calculates the proportion of bank liabilities to other entities in the 
financial system ( iρ ), or the measurement of financial connectivity of banks. The 
ratios of interbank liabilities range from 0.00 to 0.42 with the average at 0.14, which 
is close to the average value at 0.149 for the 50 largest of European banks, estimated 
                                                             
13 IFR: increasing failure rate. In general a random variable with distribution function G and density g is said to 
have an increasing failure rate (IFR) distribution if ( ) / [1 ( )]g x G x−  is an increasing function of x . All 
normal, exponential, and uniform distributions are examples of IFR distributions (Glasserman and Young, 2016).  
14 Due to the data availability, only 115 city commercial banks are included in our sample.  
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by Glasserman and Young (2015).  
Column 11 reports the leverage of outside assets ( iθ ). The average of iθ  is 
13.68 for 132 Chinese commercial banks (ranging from 7.65 to 21.23), which is far 
lower than the average of iθ  for the 50 largest of European banks at 24.9. This 
reflects that most Chinese commercial banks have sound capital adequacy ratios.  
Columns 12 and 13 calculate the contagion index and the sum of net worth for 
other commercial banks, respectively. Comparing the results from column 12 and 
column 13 in terms of Theorem 1, we conclude that the probabilities of contagion risk 
arising from the hypothetical failure of some single institution are minimal for most 
banks, in other words, the contagious defaults (domino effects) are relatively unlikely 
in Chinese banking system in terms of our present data sample.  
The total leverages for all banks in our sample are shown in column 14, in which 
the maximum is 21.49 and the minimum is 8.15 with the average at 14.47.  
We define a relative contagion index by setting the maximum value of contagion 
index as 100. Such a definition yields the relative contagion indices for other banks, 
which are measured by the ratios of relevant contagion indices of the banks to the 
maximum value of the contagion index. Column 15 reports the relative contagion 
indices, in terms of which we identify the systemically important banks in China’s 
interbank market, because it is an essential prerequisite of prudential regulation 
besides measuring systemic risk. We identified those banks with relative contagion 
indices greater than 50 as the systemically important banks, which consist of, without 
surprising, the five big state-owned commercial banks (from No. 1 to No. 5) and one 
joint-stock commercial bank (No. 11, the industrial bank co. ltd). For those banks that 
their relative contagion indices are between 20 and 50, we classified them as 
potentially important banks, which mainly include five joint-stock commercial banks. 
17 
 
Those with their relative contagion indices lower than 20 are defined as non-systemic 
banks. Obviously, most joint-stock commercial banks and all the city commercial 
banks are non-systemic banks in China. 
To estimate the amplification factor of Chinese interbank networks by applying 
Theorem 2, we assume the different scenarios for different marginal probabilities of 
defaults, given that the ρ+  is 0.42 from Table 1, the amplification factors in 
expression (4) are calculated and summarized in Table 2.  
Table 2 Amplification Factors for Different Marginal Probabilities of Defaults 
Probabilities 
of Defaults 
1% 5% 10% 50% 75% 100% 
Amplification 
Factors 
1.017 1.086 1.172 1.862 2.293 2.724 
 
6. Simulating the Contagion and Systemic Risk with the Estimated Interbank 
Structure 
Because the actual data of bilateral exposures among China’s commercial banks in the 
interbank market are unavailable, we employ the maximum entropy approach with 
iterative proportional fitting (IPF) algorithm15 to estimate the interbank bilateral 
exposures16 matrix from above bank balance sheet data, and then analyse topological 
structure of China’s commercial banks linkages in Subsection 6.1. The simulation of 
contagion and systemic risk for china’s banking system in terms of the estimated 
interbank topological structure is conducted and summarized in Subsection 6.2.    
                                                             
15 The maximum entropy method assumes that banks distribute their claims as evenly as possible among all the 
other banks by maximizing the entropy of interbank linkages. See, the discussion on the estimation methodology 
with IPF in Upper and Worms (2003).  
16 When estimating, we introduce an agent representing the other financial institutions (OFIs) to complete the 
interbank market. However, we ignore the OFIs in the later discussions because our study focuses on China’s 
commercial banking system.  
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6.1 The Topological Features of China’s Commercial Banks Networks 
Obviously, the estimated network by the maximum entropy method produces a 
complete regular network17, in which every vertex (bank) is connected with every 
other vertex. Using k-clique18 technology, firstly, we depict the topological structure 
of China’s commercial banks networks (weighted directed network) in terms of the 
estimated bilateral exposures (the adjacent matrix) in Figure 7 (a), in which the size of 
the vertex (bank) reflects the sum value of the interbank assets and interbank 
liabilities stemming from the bank’s balance sheet. As illustrated, Figure 7 (a) exhibits 
a typical core-periphery structure19 of China’s commercial banking network, where 
the big five state-owned commercial banks and the Industrial Bank Co. Ltd. are in the 
core positions, the joint-stock banks and some big city banks (such as the Bank of 
Beijing) lie in the semi-periphery, and most other city commercial banks locate in 
periphery positions. Specifically, we partition China’s commercial banks into 5 
clusters in terms of the interbank transaction volumes (the interbank assets plus 
interbank liabilities) in Figure 7 (b): the banks that have more than 1.5 trillion yuan 
transaction volumes are classified into the first cluster in which the vertices are 
marked with yellow colours, these are core-banks. Those banks whose transaction 
volumes are between 500 billion yuan and 1.5 trillion (lower than) yuan belong to the 
second cluster where the banks are marked with green colours; the banks in the third 
cluster with red colours have transaction volumes among 100 billion yuan and 500 
billion (lower than) yuan; The banks in the second and third clusters belong to the 
semi-periphery. Those banks that are marked with blue colours in the fourth cluster 
hold transaction volumes between 10 billion and 100 billion yuan; the remaining 
                                                             
17 Discussions on a complete market structure of financial networks, see, for example, Allen and Gale (2000).  
18 A clique is a subnetwork with maximum density.  
19 More characteristics about the core-periphery structure of financial networks, see, for example, Craig and von 
Peter (2010), Fricke and Lux (2012).  
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banks with transaction volumes below 10 billion yuan in the fifth cluster are marked 
with orange colours. The banks in the latter two clusters are periphery banks. Note 
that the core-banks in the first cluster consists of the “big five” state-owned banks and 
the Industrial Bank Co. Ltd, which are identified as systemic important banks in terms 
of the relative contagion indices in Section 5.  
Figure 7 (c) plots the topological structure of the commercial banks that are also 
partitioned into 5 clusters in terms of their net worth, where the classification 
standards are: more than 1 trillion for yellow first cluster, from 100 billion to 1 trillion 
for green second cluster, among 10 billion and 100 billion for red third cluster, from 2 
billion to 10 billion for the blue fourth cluster, and the fifth orange cluster for banks 
whose net worth below 2 billion yuan. Figure 7 (d) presents the topological structure 
of China’s commercial bank network by hierarchical clustering technique20 after 
partition on the basis of their net worth. 
Using the estimated adjacent matrix, secondly, we examine the centralities of the 
interbank network with Page Rank algorithm. The results are shown in Figure 8. Not 
surprisingly, the “big five” state-owned commercial banks (from No.1 to No. 5) and 
the Industrial Bank Co. Ltd. (No. 11) hold the largest centrality coefficients (from 
0.05 to 0.1) among all commercial banks, suggesting their central significant positions 
in China’s banking system. Interestingly, and worthily of highlighting, these six banks 
are also identified as systemic important banks in terms of the relative contagion 
index method in Section 5 (See Table 1 in Appendix). In addition, the centrality 
coefficients for the potential important banks (5 joint-stock banks including Nos. 6-9, 
12) that are identified in Section 5 are between 0.02 and 0.05, and for non-systemic 
banks their coefficients are below 0.02. Therefore, the relative contagion index 
                                                             
20 The hierarchical clustering groups vertices that are most similar, then groups the next pair of vertices or clusters 
that are most similar, and continues until all vertices have been joined.   
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introduced in the paper does reflect the topological features of the commercial banks 
networks of China’s interbank market. 
Furthermore, we find that the centrality coefficients of banks are significantly 
correlated with the interbank assets, interbank liabilities and total assets, and therefore 
closely connecting with the relative contagion index (Table 3). This finding suggests 
that those banks that have more total assets and conduct more interbank transactions 
(a metrics represented by the sum of interbank assets and liabilities) generally play 
central roles in the interbank networks. This supports the conclusion from Glasserman 
and Young (2015) that without knowing the detailed topological structure we can 
identify the systemically important banks and quantify the contagion risk in terms of 
banks’ balance sheet information21, especially in terms of the interbank transaction 
information. Moreover, it exhibits that the systemic significance of a bank does 
associate with the size of its balance sheet variables and its interbank position.    
Table 3 Correlations among Centralities, Balance Sheets Variables and Relative 
Contagion Index 
 
 
6.2 Simulating Results of the Contagion and Systemic Risk with the Estimated 
Interbank Networks 
In this subsection, given the estimated network structure, we examine how the failure 
                                                             
21 See, also, Craig and von Peter (2010), who show that the core-periphery positions of the banks can reliably be 
predicted by means of a regression that uses only balance sheet variables. That is, the observed interbank network 
structure is driven by factors that are reflected in bank balance sheets.  
Centrality
Interbank
Assets
Interban
Liabilities
Total
Assets
Relative
Contagion
Index
Centrality 0.866662 0.999767 0.921165 0.998968
Interbank Assets 0.859053 0.929628 0.84932
Interban Liabilities 0.919653 0.999631
Total Assets 0.918718
Relative Contagion Index
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of one or a certain banks impacts other banks’ solvency via direct effects and chain 
reactions in the banking system, that is, assess the possibility of default cascades and 
the amplification effects of potential contagion by simulation. In the simulation 
process, we assume that banks cannot react to any shock by, for example, raising 
capital or getting bail-outs from the governments to compensate for the losses 
suffered from the failure of their interbank counterparts. Considering the special 
situations of Chinese banking system, where most commercial banks are state-owned 
or the dominating shareholders are governments, we define a bank failure when its 
losses in assets exceed its net worth, in contrast with the previous studies in which the 
bank default refers to the scenario that the losses in assets exceed its Tier 1 capital.   
   Our simulation methodology follows Furfine (2003) and Upper and Worms 
(2004). They examine the possibility of contagion by letting banks go closeness one at 
a time and calculate the number of banks that fail due to their exposures to the failing 
bank. Specifically, we consider the following three failure scenarios22: the failure of 
one of the systemic important bank, the failure of one of the potential-important bank, 
and the failure of one of the non-systemic bank. Based on the relative maximum sizes 
of interbank liabilities, we choose the Industrial & Commercial Bank of China (ICBC, 
top 1 among the global 1000 banks in 2015), Shanghai Pudong Development Bank 
(SPD), and the Bank of Tianjin (Tianjin) as the first default banks, respectively.  
For simplicity, we assume that both the rate of loss given default (LGD, denoted 
by δ ), and the external capital loss (denoted by µ , due to the fire sale externality) 
are constant. The methodology of the round-by-round algorithm can be described by 
the following steps:  
A. By assumption an initial bank i  defaults.  
                                                             
22 Because of the weak possibility of interbank contagion and the limitation of space, we only consider three 
representative banks rather than all banks as the first default bank. Actually, the results for considering all banks 
are similar with the illustrative results.  
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B. Any bank j  defaults if its losses suffered from the bilateral exposures 
versus the Bank i  and from the external equity loss exceed its net worth. 
The default condition for the first round contagion is given by: 
ji j jc e eδ µ+ > ,                         (5) 
C. In a possible second round of contagion, any bank k  defaults if its losses 
suffered from the bilateral exposures versus the Bank i  and the bank j  
and from the external equity loss exceed its net worth. So the default 
condition for the second round of contagion is  
        ( )ki kj k kc c e eδ µ+ + > ,                    (6) 
D. Contagion stops if no further bank defaults. Otherwise, the third round of 
contagion occurs. This process continues until no additional bank defaults.   
Tables 4 and 5 summarize the number of bank defaults and total losses of 
banking system under three assumed scenarios for the different values of LGD ratio 
and external capital loss coefficients. Column 1 in Tables 4 and 5 presents the initial 
defaulted bank, whereas columns 2 to 7 report the total number or the total losses of 
the defaulted banks arising from financial contagion for respective LGD ratio and 
external equity loss coefficients.  
Table 4 suggests that the probability of contagion within Chinese banking system 
is minimal even if the initial failed bank is the biggest bank around the world with a 
100% LGD ratio. This result is consistent with the results that we obtained in Section 
5 following the method provided by Glasserman and Young (2016), in which the 
detailed topological structure of the banking system is not considered in assessing the 
possibility of financial contagion. 
The intuitions underpinning our results in which a failure of one systemic 
important bank does not trigger the cascade of bank failures in Chinese banking 
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system comprise, first, the interbank bilateral exposures are significantly lower 
relative to their outside assets despite the interbank markets closely connect the banks 
togehter. Second, most Chinese commercial banks maintain sound and relatively high 
levels of the net worth. Third, the model of profits earning for Chinese commercial 
banks mainly depends on the spread between the interest rates for loans and deposits, 
hence, their main activities are retail banking, which reduces the demand for interbank 
transactions. Fourth, Chinese interbank market is underdevelopment, and the 
instruments for transactions are few. These limit the size and scope of Chinese 
interbank markets.  
Nevertheless, the losses of Chinese banking system arising from an initial bank 
failure through the channel of the banks network are not trivial (Table 5). In the 
extreme case when the ICBC fails with a 100% LGD ratio, the total losses of the 
banking system reach 6,558.87 billion yuan, which accounts for 4.76% of the total 
assets held by Chinese commercial banks (excluding the rural commercial banks and 
foreign commercial banks) at the end of 2015.  
    Table 4 Number of bank defaults due to contagion in 2015 
0.5µ =  
 0.1δ =   0.25δ =  0.5δ =  0.75δ =  0.9δ =  1δ =  Remark 
ICBC 1 1 1 1 1 1 No contagion 
SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1 No contagion 
TIANJIN 1 1 1 1 1 1 No contagion 
0.25µ =  
 0.1δ =   0.25δ =  0.5δ =  0.75δ =  0.9δ =  1δ =  Remark 
ICBC 1 1 1 1 1 1 No contagion 
SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1 No contagion 
TIANJIN 1 1 1 1 1 1 No contagion 
0µ =  
 0.1δ =   0.25δ =  0.5δ =  0.75δ =  0.9δ =  1δ =  Remark 
ICBC 1 1 1 1 1 1 No contagion 
SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1 No contagion 
TIANJIN 1 1 1 1 1 1 No contagion 
 
24 
 
    
Table 5 Losses of Banking System by a Bank Default (Unit, RMB Billion Yuan) 
0.5µ =  
 0.1δ =   0.25δ =  0.5δ =  0.75δ =  0.9δ =  1δ =  Remark 
ICBC 5271.19  5485.80  5843.49  6201.18  6415.79  6558.87   
SPD 5192.44  5288.93  5449.75  5610.57  5707.07  5771.39   
TIANJIN 5137.91  5152.61  5177.11  5201.61  5216.31  5226.11   
0.25µ =  
        
 0.1δ =   0.25δ =  0.5δ =  0.75δ =  0.9δ =  1δ =  Remark 
ICBC 2707.13  2921.75  3279.44  3637.12  3851.74  3994.81   
SPD 2628.38  2724.88  2885.70  3046.52  3143.01  3207.34   
TIANJIN 2573.86  2588.56  2613.06  2637.56  2652.26  2662.06   
0µ =  
 0.1δ =   0.25δ =  0.5δ =  0.75δ =  0.9δ =  1δ =  Remark 
ICBC 143.08  357.69  715.38  1073.07  1287.68  1430.76   
SPD 64.33  160.82  321.64  482.46  578.96  643.28   
TIANJIN 9.80  24.50  49.00  73.50  88.20  98.00   
 
In addition, we calculate the possibility of the failure of any bank i  given the 
assumed three defaults scenarios according to equation (3), in contrast with the results 
from the above round-by-round algorithm. The results in Table 6 show that all the 
banks are immune to the failure of the ICBC. This is consistent with the results from 
the round-by-round simulation.  
6.3 Robust Tests 
We conduct robust tests using the balance sheets data of our sample at the end of 2014. 
We apply two approaches and obtain similar results. Based on the limitation of space, 
we do not present the results of our robust tests, which are provided on the request.  
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Table 6 Immunity of Banks under Assumed Three Default Scenarios*  
The initial failed bank is the ICBC, so the *( 1) / ( 1)θ θ− −  =1.03 
 /ji jc e
 
 
/ji jc e
  
 
/ji jc e
  
 /ji jc e
 
BOC 0.08 JINSHANG 0.00  MINTAI 0.11  GUANGZHOU 0.03  
CCB 0.05  CHANGZHI 0.04  CHOUZHOU 0.01  HUARUN 0.10  
ABC 0.11  JINCHENG 0.03  NINGBOCB 0.05  DONGGUAN 0.02  
JCB 0.11  DATONG 0.19  HAIXIA 0.02  NANYUE 0.12  
CMB 0.08  JILIN 0.05  XIAMEN 0.06  HUAXING 0.03  
SPD 0.09  SHENGJING 0.22  QUANZHOU 0.14  BEIBUWAN 0.01  
CITIC 0.07  JINZHOU 0.06  XIAMENINTER 0.10  LIUZHOU 0.02  
EVERBRIGHT 0.11  HULUDAO 0.06  NANCHANG 0.04  GUILIN 0.20  
HUAXIA 0.07  DALIAN 0.04  JIUJIANG 0.05  CHONGQING 0.23  
INDUSTRIAL 0.04  ANSHAN 0.08  GANZHOU 0.01  SANXIA 0.08  
MINSHENG 0.12  FUSHUN 0.15  SHANGRAO 0.08  CHENGDU 0.26  
PINGAN 0.12  DANDONG 0.09  QILU 0.01  DAZHOU 0.23  
GUANGFA 0.12  YINGKOU 0.10  JINING 0.04  MIANYANG 0.03  
HENGFENG 0.02  FUXIN 0.16  QINGDAO 0.03  ZIGONG 0.16  
BOHAI 0.03  LIAOYANG 0.04  LINSHANG 0.01  PANZHIHUA 0.13  
ZHESHANG 0.07  CHAOYANG 0.01  ZAOZHUANG 0.04  DEYANG 0.02  
BEIJING 0.33  YANHAI 0.27  DONGYING 0.03  LUZHOU 0.10  
TIANJIN 0.14  HARBIN 0.09  WEIFANG 0.09  LESHAN 0.20  
HEBEI 0.15  LONGJIANG 0.02  YANTAI 0.02  NANCHONG 0.13  
TANGSHAN 0.00  SHANGHAI 0.14  WEIHAI 0.05  YIBIN 0.02  
QINHUANGDAO 0.16  NANJING 0.06  QISHANG 0.06  LIANGSHAN 0.15  
CANGZHOU 0.00  JIANGSU 0.10  TAIAN 0.22  GUIYANG 0.03  
CHENGDE 0.03  CHANGJIANG 0.00  RIZHAO 0.02  FUDIAN 0.02  
HANDAN 0.16  SUZHOU 0.11  LAISHANG 0.01  QUJING 0.08  
BAODING 0.14  HANGZHOU 0.17  ZHENGZHOU 0.08  XI'AN 0.22  
LANGFANG 0.18  NINGBO 0.04  LUOYANG 0.03  CHANG'AN 0.13  
ZHANGJIAKOU 0.40  WENZHOU 0.05  JIAOZUO 0.05  LANZHOU 0.04  
HENGSHUI 0.01  JIAXING 0.02  ZHONGYUAN 0.02  GANSU 0.23  
BAOSHANG 0.14  HUZHOU 0.02  HUISHANG 0.08  QINGHAI 0.00  
NEIMENGGU 0.05  SHAOXING 0.06  HANKOU 0.01  NINGXIA 0.05  
WUHAI 0.08  JINHUA 0.06  HUBEI 0.01  WULUMUQI 0.00  
ORDOS 0.05  TAIZHOU 0.04  CHANGSHA 0.03  KUNLUN 0.31  
  TAILONG 0.04  HUARONG 0.14    
*We only report the results for the scenario of assumed ICBC default. The results are 
same for another two scenarios, which are provided on the request due to the limited 
space.  
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7. Conclusion 
Relying on the balance sheet data of Chinese commercial banks, we examine the 
contagion effects and systemic risk in China’s interbank market. Two approaches are 
employed in our study: one only uses the balance sheet variables without considering 
the detailed topological structure of the interbank network; another one needs to 
estimate the bilateral exposures matrix. The simulation results from two methods are 
consistent, and both suggest that the domino effects of Chinese interbank networks 
arising from an assumed bank default are minimal, whereas the amplification effects 
(snowball effects) of losses through the channel of interbank networks are non-trial. 
Comparing two methods, we feel that the former is straightforward and insightful, and 
the latter is more intuitive and extensively applicable, helps analyse the microstructure 
of the banking system and the transmission channels of financial contagion in the 
banking system. 
In particular, using a relative contagion index, we identify the systemic important 
banks for China. The measures that capture the topological features of the interbank 
networks by applying k-clique, partition and hierarchical clustering techniques 
support our identifications.  
Despite the possibility of financial contagion in China’s banking system is trial, 
the systemic losses stemming from a hypothetical bank failure due to the financial 
network are non-trivial. Thus, the systemic risk in Chinese interbank markets should 
attain proper concern by the policy makers and prudential regulators.  
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Appendix 
          Table 1 Balance Sheets and Contagion Risk of China’s Commercial Banks (Unit: Million RMB Yuan) 
Category No. & Bank Name Abbreviation Outside Assets Interbank Assets Total Assets 
Outside 
Liabilities 
Interbank 
Liabilities Net Worth iρ   
Leverage 
of Outside 
Assets 
iθ  
Contagion 
Index 
Net Worth of 
other Banks 
Total 
Leverage 
Relative 
Contagion 
Index 
Big 
State-Owned 
Commercial 
Banks 
1.Bank of China Limited BOC 15884372.00  931225.00  16815597.0  13429226.0  2028766.00  1357605.00  0.13  11.70  1906548.47  8898616.25  12.39  87.06  
2.Industrial & Commercial 
Bank of China (The) ICBC 21525987.00  683793.00  22209780.0  18143401.0  2265860.00  1800519.00  0.11  11.96  2189944.50  8455702.25  12.34  100.00  
3.China Construction Bank 
Corporation Joint Stock 
Company 
CCB 17685744.00  663745.00  18349489.0  15143299.0  1761107.00  1445083.00  0.10  12.24  1691957.81  8811138.25  12.70  77.26  
4.Agricultural Bank of 
China Limited ABC 16589218.00  1202175.00  17791393.0  15041848.0  1537660.00  1211885.00  0.09  13.69  1426164.75  9044336.25  14.68  65.12  
5.Bank of Communications 
Co. Ltd JCB 6620463.00  534899.0  7155362.00  5161216.00  1456054.00  538092.00  0.22  12.30  1338355.64  9718129.25  13.30  61.11  
Joint-Stock 
Commercial 
Banks 
6.China Merchants Bank 
Co Ltd CMB 5225506.00  249472.0  5474978.00  4222888.00  890332.00  361758.00  0.17  14.44  846893.05  9894463.25  15.13  38.67  
7.Shanghai Pudong 
Development Bank SPD 4795158.00  249194.0  5044352.00  3583215.00  1142537.00  318600.00  0.24  15.05  1082289.79  9937621.25  15.83  49.42  
8.China CITIC Bank 
Corporation Limited CITIC 4922713.00  199579.0  5122292.00  3684814.00  1117792.00  319686.00  0.23  15.40  1071340.59  9936535.25  16.02  48.92  
9.China Everbright Bank 
Co Ltd EVERBRIGHT 2949038.00  218672.0  3167710.00  2342292.00  601371.00  224047.00  0.20  13.16  556697.75  10032174.25  14.14  25.42  
10.Hua Xia Bank Co., Ltd HUAXIA 1940138.00  80466.00  2020604.00  1567875.00  334341.00  118388.00  0.18  16.39  320197.98  10137833.25  17.07  14.62  
11.Industrial Bank Co Ltd INDUSTRIAL 5200197.00  98683.00  5298880.00  3112118.00  1869385.00  317377.00  0.38  16.38  1832352.70  9938844.25  16.70  83.67  
12.China Minsheng 
Banking Corporation MINSHENG 4190043.00  330645.00  4520688.00  3220130.00  990775.00  309783.00  0.24  13.53  912978.23  9946438.25  14.59  41.69  
13.Ping An Bank Co Ltd PINGAN 2321467.00  185682.00  2507149.00  2022400.00  323249.00  161500.00  0.14  14.37  297660.55  10094721.25  15.52  13.59  
14.China Guangfa Bank Co 
Ltd GUANGFA 1730466.00  106121.10  1836587.10  1288436.82  450610.11  97540.17  0.26  17.74  423112.73  10158681.08  18.83  19.32  
15.China Hengfeng Bank HENGFENG 1056389.39  11766.28  1068155.67  823231.54  187956.10  56968.03  0.19  18.54  185769.02  10199253.22  18.75  8.48  
16.China Bohai Bank BOHAI 754766.18  9469.26  764235.44  481571.89  247106.55  35557.00  0.34  21.23  243895.37  10220664.25  21.49  11.14  
17.China Zheshang Bank 
Co. Ltd ZHESHANG 998204.75  33445.64  1031650.39  654940.51  327052.81  49657.06  0.33  20.10  315913.75  10206564.19  20.78  14.43  
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City 
Commercial 
Banks 
18.Bank of Beijing Co Ltd BEIJING 1490003.00  354906.00  1844909.00  1299917.00  428178.00  116814.00  0.25  12.76  340241.32  10139407.25  15.79  15.54  
19.Bank of Tianjin TIANJIN 521428.67  44239.06  565667.73  379403.73  153016.29  33247.70  0.29  15.68  140302.09  10222973.55  17.01  6.41  
20.Bank of Hebei HEBEI 199652.32  22986.28  222638.60  190875.72  15997.59  15765.28  0.08  12.66  14220.05  10240455.97  14.12  0.65  
21.Bank of TangShan TANGSHAN 124747.57  116.61  124864.18  99120.70  17593.52  8149.96  0.15  15.31  17575.94  10248071.29  15.32  0.80  
22.Bank of QinHuangDao QINHUANGDAO 33117.74  3196.86  36314.60  34184.28  5.41  2124.91  0.00  15.59  4.90  10254096.34  17.09  0.00  
23.Bank of CangZhou CANGZHOU 83523.96  25.72  83549.68  78716.47  59.11  4774.10  0.00  17.50  59.09  10251447.15  17.50  0.00  
24.Bank of ChengDe CHENGDE 63519.03  932.56  64451.59  58023.26  2581.91  3846.42  0.04  16.51  2542.18  10252374.83  16.76  0.12  
25.Bank of HanDan HANDAN 101996.84  9334.18  111331.02  100948.71  4288.87  6093.44  0.04  16.74  3908.46  10250127.81  18.27  0.18  
26.Bank of BaoDing BAODING 316744.51  35850.83  352595.34  260413.09  65947.15  26235.10  0.20  12.07  58702.82  10229986.15  13.44  2.68  
27.Bank of LangFang LANGFANG 118411.58  11352.31  129763.89  91870.70  31206.60  6686.59  0.25  17.71  28328.19  10249534.66  19.41  1.29  
28.Bank of ZhangJiaKou ZHANGJIAKOU 96286.05  28724.64  125010.69  94740.62  22745.12  7524.95  0.19  12.80  17184.06  10248696.30  16.61  0.78  
29.Bank of HengShui HENGSHUI 33462.92  166.45  33629.37  64248.79  14.65  2843.50  0.00  11.77  6.98  10253377.75  11.83  0.00  
30.BaoShang Bank BAOSHANG 316744.51  35850.83  352595.34  260413.09  65947.15  26235.10  0.20  12.07  58702.82  10229986.15  13.44  2.68  
31.Bank of NeiMengGu NEIMENGGU 102868.34  3905.33  106773.67  84804.14  12939.24  9030.30  0.13  11.39  12422.25  10247190.95  11.82  0.57  
32.Bank of WuHai WUHAI 32660.63  2474.42  35135.05  24219.32  7833.08  3082.65  0.24  10.59  7228.37  10253138.60  11.40  0.33  
33.Ordos Bank ORDOS 57816.32  3572.75  61389.07  43020.02  11377.57  6991.49  0.21  8.27  10630.31  10249229.76  8.78  0.49  
34.JinShang Bank JINSHANG 156912.13  330.50  157242.63  117066.93  31178.77  8996.93  0.21  17.44  31109.26  10247224.32  17.48  1.42  
35.ChangZhi Bank CHANGZHI 23900.08  523.86  24423.94  18722.04  4148.77  1553.13  0.18  15.39  4053.74  10254668.12  15.73  0.19  
36.JinCheng Bank JINCHENG 64317.83  1362.10  65679.93  44827.15  15442.65  5410.13  0.26  11.89  15093.65  10250811.12  12.14  0.69  
37.Datong Commercial 
City Bank DATONG 29070.13  2917.38  31987.51  30394.41  0.00  1593.11  0.00  18.25  0.00  10254628.14  20.08  0.00  
38.Bank of JiLin JILIN 347636.35  9897.28  357533.63  283265.25  53639.98  20628.40  0.16  16.85  52064.20  10235592.85  17.33  2.38  
39.ShengJing Bank SHENGJING 615992.83  85635.67  701628.50  547925.93  111987.62  41714.95  0.17  14.77  97455.21  10214506.30  16.82  4.45  
40.Bank of JinZhou JINZHOU 346055.56  15604.35  361659.91  215181.61  120206.99  26271.31  0.36  13.17  114614.22  10229949.94  13.77  5.23  
41.Bank of HuLuDao HULUDAO 44264.04  2136.53  46400.57  40621.53  1780.68  3998.36  0.04  11.07  1690.96  10252222.89  11.60  0.08  
42.Bank of Dalian DALIAN 236652.35  7707.22  244359.57  183065.67  42821.78  18472.12  0.19  12.81  41360.71  10237749.13  13.23  1.89  
43.Bank of AnShan ANSHAN 87273.07  5868.35  93141.42  84812.23  980.51  7348.68  0.01  11.88  913.44  10248872.57  12.67  0.04  
44.Bank of FuShun FUSHUN 46956.06  5352.06  52308.12  37513.85  11146.32  3647.95  0.23  12.87  9920.35  10252573.30  14.34  0.45  
45.Bank of DanDong DANDONG 59549.01  4110.15  63659.16  49038.49  10033.85  4586.82  0.17  12.98  9335.71  10251634.43  13.88  0.43  
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46.Bank of YingKou YINGKOU 97566.31  7573.34  105139.65  94337.71  2524.58  8277.36  0.03  11.79  2327.19  10247943.89  12.70  0.11  
47.Bnak of FuXin FUXIN 92004.09  11305.06  103309.15  78039.87  17719.39  7549.88  0.19  12.19  15627.49  10248671.37  13.68  0.71  
48.Bank of LiaoYang LIAOYANG 89932.81  2646.65  92579.46  79035.54  6544.89  6999.03  0.08  12.85  6342.48  10249222.22  13.23  0.29  
49.Bank of ChaoYang CHAOYANG 50180.79  450.48  50631.27  43990.12  2645.90  3995.25  0.06  12.56  2620.34  10252226.00  12.67  0.12  
50.Yingkou Yanhai Bank 
Co. Limited YANHAI 48917.85  6406.33  55324.18  40058.56  12786.90  2478.72  0.24  19.74  11236.77  10253742.53  22.32  0.51  
51.Harbin Bank HARBIN 414816.21  30035.06  444851.27  358974.38  52028.93  33847.96  0.13  12.26  48226.79  10222373.29  13.14  2.20  
52.LongJinag Bank LONGJIANG 213710.30  2249.98  215960.28  181032.87  21875.78  13051.62  0.11  16.37  21633.21  10243169.63  16.55  0.99  
53.Bank of ShangHai SHANGHAI 1330795.09  118345.40  1449140.49  994737.56  361568.53  92834.40  0.27  14.34  330019.62  10163386.85  15.61  15.07  
54.Bank of NanJing NANJING 773428.59  31591.65  805020.24  649160.98  103445.33  52413.92  0.14  14.76  99103.08  10203807.33  15.36  4.53  
55.Bank of JiangSu JIANGSU 1230585.84  59747.50  1290333.34  921969.45  302829.32  65534.56  0.25  18.78  288056.86  10190686.69  19.69  13.15  
56.Jiangsu Changjiang 
Commercial Bank CHANGJIANG 17103.02  44.36  17147.38  16058.50  0.00  1088.87  0.00  15.71  0.00  10255132.38  15.75  0.00  
57.Bank of SuZhou SUZHOU 209667.82  21233.56  230901.38  160330.25  50947.37  19623.76  0.24  10.68  45827.12  10236597.49  11.77  2.09  
58.Bank of HangZhou HANGZHOU 492516.90  52797.67  545314.57  439454.70  73965.42  31894.44  0.14  15.44  66359.17  10224326.81  17.10  3.03  
59.Bank of NingBo NINGBO 700883.53  15581.12  716464.65  582534.21  88833.12  45097.32  0.13  15.54  86771.48  10211123.93  15.89  3.96  
60.Bank of WenZhou WENZHOU 151136.36  4930.45  156066.81  109143.49  37014.91  9908.41  0.25  15.25  35766.26  10246312.84  15.75  1.63  
61.Bank of JiaXing JIAXING 49318.91  739.25  50058.16  39109.39  7659.20  3289.58  0.16  14.99  7538.13  10252931.67  15.22  0.34  
62.Bank of HuZhou HUZHOU 32932.66  393.68  33326.34  30538.73  235.65  2551.96  0.01  12.90  232.64  10253669.29  13.06  0.01  
63.Bank of ShaoXing SHAOXING 84107.25  2439.47  86546.72  72877.24  9066.57  4602.91  0.11  18.27  8796.66  10251618.34  18.80  0.40  
64.Bank of JinHua JINHUA 53031.70  2259.16  55290.86  49715.34  1839.99  3735.53  0.04  14.20  1759.36  10252485.72  14.80  0.08  
65.TaiZhou Bank TAIZHOU 119593.73  3805.92  123399.65  112644.48  305.99  10449.19  0.00  11.45  295.68  10245772.06  11.81  0.01  
66.Zhejiang Tailong 
Commercial Bank TAILONG 105754.79  2961.65  108716.44  92165.27  9514.04  7037.14  0.09  15.03  9236.92  10249184.11  15.45  0.42  
67.Zhejiang Mintai 
Commercial Bank MINTAI 97652.91  7352.96  105005.87  77886.35  20091.75  7027.77  0.21  13.90  18583.92  10249193.48  14.94  0.85  
68.Zhejiang Chouzhou 
Commercial Bank CHOUZHOU 131661.90  1387.37  133049.27  91254.57  30541.88  11252.83  0.25  11.70  30193.98  10244968.42  11.82  1.38  
69.NingBo Commercial 
Bank NINGBOCB 47190.11  3105.56  50295.67  35196.74  8928.95  6169.98  0.20  7.65  8300.53  10250051.27  8.15  0.38  
70.HaiXia Bank of Fujian HAIXIA 132603.93  1079.55  133683.48  102141.80  24143.77  7397.90  0.19  17.92  23937.38  10248823.35  18.07  1.09  
71.XiaMen Bank XIAMEN 155916.58  4403.56  160320.14  114048.77  38043.28  8228.09  0.25  18.95  36941.80  10247993.16  19.48  1.69  
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72.Bank of QuanZhou QUANZHOU 67275.40  6518.48  73793.88  57172.67  11615.56  5005.85  0.17  13.44  10514.82  10251215.40  14.74  0.48  
73.XiaMen International 
Bank XIAMENINTER 432873.31  26331.38  459204.69  321877.90  109534.70  27792.09  0.25  15.58  102849.22  10228429.16  16.52  4.70  
74.Bank of NanChang NANCHANG 205225.38  7862.37  213087.75  183801.47  9077.69  20208.59  0.05  10.16  8707.65  10236012.66  10.54  0.40  
75.Bank of JiuJinag JIUJIANG 169253.80  5622.52  174876.32  137157.64  25144.15  12574.54  0.15  13.46  24273.10  10243646.71  13.91  1.11  
76.Bank of GanZhou GANZHOU 89603.26  311.73  89914.99  80596.81  3277.92  6040.26  0.04  14.83  3265.74  10250180.99  14.89  0.15  
77.Bank of ShangRao SHANGRAO 62245.70  3513.18  65758.88  49398.29  11503.75  4856.84  0.19  12.82  10840.15  10251364.41  13.54  0.49  
78.QiLu Bank QILU 151494.27  1387.22  152881.49  141717.50  1112.48  10051.52  0.01  15.07  1101.68  10246169.73  15.21  0.05  
79.Bank of JiNing JINING 44154.07  1326.73  45480.80  39767.29  1992.95  3720.57  0.05  11.87  1929.63  10252500.68  12.22  0.09  
80.Bank of QingDao QINGDAO 182541.84  4693.41  187235.25  140233.74  30387.86  16613.65  0.18  10.99  29551.96  10239607.60  11.27  1.35  
81.LinShang Bank LINSHANG 68222.83  408.60  68631.43  59298.42  3568.03  5764.98  0.06  11.83  3544.84  10250456.27  11.90  0.16  
82.ZaoZhuang Bank ZAOZHUANG 13343.57  409.35  13752.92  12621.00  151.41  980.51  0.01  13.61  146.56  10255240.74  14.03  0.01  
83.DongYing Bank DONGYING 54797.82  1169.27  55967.09  50239.85  1049.01  4678.23  0.02  11.71  1025.09  10251543.02  11.96  0.05  
84.Bank of WeiFang WEIFANG 85703.74  6081.96  91785.70  73332.09  11351.84  7101.77  0.13  12.07  10536.56  10249119.48  12.92  0.48  
85.YanTai Bank YANTAI 52539.42  829.53  53368.95  47126.71  1409.72  4832.53  0.03  10.87  1385.63  10251388.72  11.04  0.06  
86.WeiHai City 
Commercial Bank WEIHAI 147091.29  4186.43  151277.72  130570.74  11437.12  9269.86  0.08  15.87  11099.95  10246951.39  16.32  0.51  
87.QiShang Bank QISHANG 78962.02  4267.23  83229.25  75609.65  538.12  7081.47  0.01  11.15  507.96  10249139.78  11.75  0.02  
88.TaiAn Bank TAIAN 47234.23  5515.07  52749.30  41699.43  8432.46  2617.41  0.17  18.05  7504.79  10253603.84  20.15  0.34  
89.Bank of RiZhao RIZHAO 90302.05  1686.05  91988.10  82690.96  1722.21  7574.93  0.02  11.92  1687.81  10248646.32  12.14  0.08  
90.LaiShang Bank LAISHANG 63639.12  556.55  64195.67  47529.18  11458.73  5207.75  0.19  12.22  11350.62  10251013.50  12.33  0.52  
91.Bank of ZhengZhou ZHENGZHOU 252424.00  13199.00  265623.00  220526.00  27273.00  17824.00  0.11  14.16  25820.31  10238397.25  14.90  1.18  
92.Bank of LuoYang LUOYANG 163544.77  3162.73  166707.50  133983.88  19394.50  13329.11  0.13  12.27  18994.58  10242892.14  12.51  0.87  
93.JiaoZuo City 
Commercial Bank JIAOZUO 39240.22  2145.15  41385.37  27447.77  9705.90  4231.70  0.26  9.27  9145.51  10251989.55  9.78  0.42  
94.ZhongYuan Bank ZHONGYUAN 299219.96  6927.21  306147.17  243123.67  29895.84  33127.66  0.11  9.03  29137.31  10223093.59  9.24  1.33  
95.HuiShang Bank HUISHANG 604856.96  31273.66  636130.62  496588.01  97197.35  42345.26  0.16  14.28  92078.13  10213875.99  15.02  4.20  
96.HanKou Bank HANKOU 182008.75  1133.33  183142.08  160984.64  6274.78  15882.66  0.04  11.46  6232.26  10240338.59  11.53  0.28  
97.HuBei Bank Co. Ltd. HUBEI 153188.43  1515.71  154704.14  137066.95  6577.33  11059.86  0.05  13.85  6507.93  10245161.39  13.99  0.30  
98.Bank of ChangSha CHANGSHA 280492.73  4927.74  285420.47  235740.81  31815.44  17864.22  0.12  15.70  31229.48  10238357.03  15.98  1.43  
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99.Huarong XiangJiang 
Bank HUARONG 194515.96  16608.56  211124.52  182229.85  16015.57  12879.10  0.08  15.10  14673.82  10243342.15  16.39  0.67  
100.Bank of GuangZhou GUANGZHOU 410228.26  4964.08  415192.34  314865.46  80514.21  19812.67  0.20  20.71  79503.34  10236408.58  20.96  3.63  
101.China Resources Bank HUARUN 107622.08  8771.76  116393.84  93650.65  13897.62  8845.57  0.13  12.17  12764.11  10247375.68  13.16  0.58  
102.Bank of DongGuan DONGGUAN 189846.17  2215.45  192061.62  154595.62  22305.57  15160.43  0.13  12.52  22026.22  10241060.82  12.67  1.01  
103.Guangdong Nanyue 
Bank NANYUE 154445.46  11539.79  165985.25  121020.85  34423.83  10540.57  0.22  14.65  31868.30  10245680.68  15.75  1.46  
104.Guangdong Huaxing 
Bank HUAXING 104453.84  1578.50  106032.34  85976.34  14184.80  5871.20  0.14  17.79  13961.25  10250350.05  18.06  0.64  
105.Guangxi Beibu Gulf 
Bank BEIBUWAN 112363.22  664.50  113027.72  94039.00  8004.13  10984.60  0.08  10.23  7952.01  10245236.65  10.29  0.36  
106.Bank of LiuZhou LIUZHOU 88283.87  1642.54  89926.41  73424.26  8124.48  8377.68  0.10  10.54  7960.84  10247843.57  10.73  0.36  
107.GuiLin Bank GUILIN 127408.73  16227.38  143636.11  100817.49  34406.57  8412.06  0.25  15.15  30277.65  10247809.19  17.08  1.38  
108.Bank of ChongQing CHONGQING 273951.43  45856.56  319807.99  225279.44  73235.55  21292.99  0.25  12.87  61985.43  10234928.26  15.02  2.83  
109.Chongqing Three 
Gorges Bank SANXIA 124692.98  7936.76  132629.74  112794.15  9945.43  9890.16  0.08  12.61  9302.32  10246331.09  13.41  0.42  
110.Bank of ChengDu CHENGDU 270661.20  50784.14  321445.34  290372.71  10793.55  20279.08  0.04  13.35  8973.49  10235942.17  15.85  0.41  
111.Dazhou City 
Commercial Bank DAZHOU 18253.50  4778.65  23032.15  16210.19  4640.78  2181.17  0.22  8.37  3577.20  10254040.08  10.56  0.16  
112.Mianyang City 
Commercial Bank MIANYANG 51663.77  1032.87  52696.64  47750.23  1032.49  3913.92  0.02  13.20  1010.63  10252307.33  13.46  0.05  
113.ZiGong Commercial 
Bank ZIGONG 36704.56  5508.23  42212.79  30997.99  7515.22  3699.58  0.20  9.92  6440.38  10252521.67  11.41  0.29  
114.Panzhihua City 
Commercial Bank PANZHIHUA 56468.87  6342.60  62811.47  49223.84  8407.18  5180.45  0.15  10.90  7481.93  10251040.80  12.12  0.34  
115.Greatwall Bank DEYANG 82269.18  926.22  83195.40  67417.11  10437.17  5341.12  0.13  15.40  10313.00  10250880.13  15.58  0.47  
116.Luzhou City 
Commercial Bank LUZHOU 28489.63  2983.72  31473.35  21271.89  7079.66  3121.81  0.25  9.13  6334.59  10253099.44  10.08  0.29  
117.Leshan City 
Commercial Bank LESHAN 61552.60  10906.08  72458.68  56794.69  9926.64  5737.35  0.15  10.73  8304.06  10250483.90  12.63  0.38  
118.Nanchong City 
Commercial Bank NANCHONG 127847.16  13300.10  141147.26  118983.27  24820.51  10643.58  0.17  12.01  20229.32  10245577.67  13.26  0.92  
119.Yibin City 
Commercial City Bank YIBIN 28570.61  653.94  29224.55  24606.22  1164.42  3453.91  0.05  8.27  1134.87  10252767.34  8.46  0.05  
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120.Liangshan Prefectural 
Commercial Bank LIANGSHAN 20085.09  3000.63  23085.72  20991.32  3.36  2091.04  0.00  9.61  2.88  10254130.21  11.04  0.00  
121.GuiYang Bank GUIYANG 233877.66  4318.89  238196.55  215320.51  8742.16  14133.88  0.04  16.55  8573.65  10242087.37  16.85  0.39  
122.Fudian Bank FUDIAN 151969.79  2065.64  154035.43  124389.97  15570.35  14075.11  0.11  10.80  15340.55  10242146.14  10.94  0.70  
123.Qujing City 
Commercial Bank QUJING 26475.19  1204.91  27680.10  24762.84  1235.17  1682.08  0.05  15.74  1177.92  10254539.17  16.46  0.05  
124.Bank of Xi'an XI'AN 179988.16  30035.44  210023.60  183535.78  12068.94  14418.88  0.06  12.48  10215.73  10241802.37  14.57  0.47  
125.Chang'an Bank CHANG'AN 148006.65  11885.59  159892.24  137220.36  12767.80  9904.08  0.09  14.94  11756.03  10246317.17  16.14  0.54  
126.Bank of LanZhou LANZHOU 200282.40  5291.53  205573.93  189455.24  1860.56  14258.13  0.01  14.05  1809.10  10241963.12  14.42  0.08  
127.Bank of GanSu GANSU 183609.76  26573.77  210183.53  166336.64  31516.94  12329.95  0.16  14.89  27283.89  10243891.30  17.05  1.25  
128.Bnak of QingHai QINGHAI 70285.46  149.96  70435.42  56816.69  7950.00  5668.73  0.12  12.40  7931.59  10250552.52  12.43  0.36  
129.Bank of NingXia NINGXIA 114509.15  4488.67  118997.82  94736.32  14665.33  9596.16  0.13  11.93  14063.62  10246625.09  12.40  0.64  
130.Bank of Urumqi Co 
Ltd. WULUMUQI 103197.93  241.43  103439.36  88343.82  7280.94  7814.60  0.08  13.21  7262.56  10248406.65  13.24  0.33  
131.Bank of KunLun KUNLUN 222444.57  67734.00  290178.57  154553.14  112684.67  22940.77  0.42  9.70  84123.65  10233280.48  12.65  3.84  
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Figure 7 Topological Structure of China’s Commercial Banks Networks 
 
 
(a) Partition by k-clique technology, the size of the vertex (bank) is quantified by the sum of interbank claims and liabilities 
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(b) Clustering in terms of the sum of interbank assets and interbank liabilities 
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          (c) Clustering in terms of the net worth 
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(d) Hierarchical clustering in terms of the net worth 
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Figure 8 Centralities of Commercial Banks in China 
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